| When Labour
proposed a public private partnership (PPP) part privatisation for London
Underground rail unions and passengers were sceptical. But no, we were assured,
Labour had learnt from the lessons of the Tory privatisation of the mainline
railways. This time round PPP would be properly handled with all the benefits
of private investment without the disorganisation and safety breaches. So
what happened? GREG TUCKER reports.
Already it has become clear that our fears have been realised. Privatisation
has meant huge extra costs for the public with no significant investment
in a better service and an increased risk of significant safety breaches.
For the workforce it has meant worsening industrial relations, attacks
on jobs, pay and conditions and more and more insecurity.
In 2005, the House of Commons Transport Committee Inquiry into the performance
of London Underground reported that it would be wrong to claim that PPP
had produced no benefits for the Tube.
But, it went on, this was hardly surprising. It pointed out that central
government expenditure had increased from £44 million in 1997-98
to £1048 million in 2004-05 – an increase of 2276%.
But the National Audit Office reported that there was only an improved
prospect – but not the certainty – that infrastructure upgrades
would be delivered. Passengers could expect only marginal improvements
in the first seven and a half years of the PPP.
The terms of the contracts have allowed the new private consortia running
the tube infrastructure to make massive profits, at little or no risk,
with no urgency for them to carry out the much needed work to rebuild
the dilapidated Underground system.
London Underground, themselves, reported that key parts of the service
had not improved. Engineering over-runs and inadequate planning had hampered
the tube. The only improvements it could point to were cleaner stations
and less graffiti on trains.
Setting up PPP was hugely expensive. The government spent £109 million
on external advisors to prepare the privatisation, and then gave the private
sector bidders another £275 million to cover their costs.
They then gave huge annual sums to the consortia who won the contracts.
In 2003-04 they made £158 million operating profit on a turnover
of £1.1 billion – a margin of 13%.
These huge gains are in part achieved because the privateers negotiated
with the government that upgrades to increase network capacity would not
be delivered until after the first periodic review, seven and a half years
into the PPP. However at that time the scope, price and funding arrangements
could be substantially renegotiated.
With the government over a barrel with little or no option but to continue
with the existing contractors, it cannot be ruled out that major work
will again be put on hold for sometime later in the PPP lifetime.
Even if major work were to be scheduled Transport for London has said
that in its view, “detailed work plans have sometimes been either
non-existent, incomplete or inconsistent rather than competent or professional.”
They conclude that, “the planning capability demonstrated this past
year will not be adequate to manage the volume of work.”
The government has always argued that the good deal offered to the privateers
is because they will be shouldering a large financial risk. But even there
the reality is somewhat different.
The National Audit Office has made clear that the risk transfer to the
private sector is extremely limited.
If things do go wrong it is still the people of London who will carry
the can. Lenders stand to have 95% of their £3.8 billion financial
commitments returned in the event of termination leaving them exposed
to around £200 million worth of risk.
However they are able to charge interest payments on their loans with
a credit rating which results in £450 million more being repaid
than through direct government borrowing.
Then there is the question of safety: reproducing the infrastructure/operations
split that characterised the mainline rail privatisation debacle has produced
exactly the same result.
Lack of maintenance, confusion of responsibility and poor lines of communication
have led to a series of safety problems which could have led to serious
loss of life if it were not for a rearguard action by the rail unions.
Incidents of track safety being compromised rose from 69 in 2000/1 to
149 in 2003/4. Industrial action by the RMT in 2001 forced the creation
of a joint safety forum but despite this it remains hard to address network
wide safety issues with so many conflicting players passing the blame
between themselves.
A series of derailments at Chancery Lane, Hammersmith (twice), White City
and Camden Town highlight the problem.
The report into the Chancery Lane incident showed that vital information
had not been passed on from the previous 2002 Loughton derailment.
The report on the White City derailment showed that the privateer Metronet
was not conversant with the official regulatory notice issued after Camden
Town – measures to avoid serious incident had not been adequately
relayed to track operatives.
Time and again it has taken action by the RMT to force LUL and the infrastructure
consortia to sort out safety problems. This was clearly seen last autumn
with the Northern Line dispute where drivers were forced to exercise their
rights under Health & Safety law to refuse to work in unsafe conditions
in order to force their bosses to act.
Brake safety “tripcock” devices were failing to work when
tested. But instead of sorting the problem out, the various companies
involved all blamed each other, whilst insisting trains should still run
as if everything was normal.
The private sector makes £3 million a week out of the London Underground
contracts, but it could not maintain a basic, and crucial, safety system.
On the Northern Line under PPP, LUL runs the trains, Tubelines are responsible
for maintaining them, but Alstom supplies the trains and actually does
the work.
Alstom’s PFI contract, first agreed in 1995 and with another ten
years to run, allows them over two months to find and rectify any faults.
The faulty “trip-cock” component is itself designed and built
by a further sub-contractor.
Because of the complex web of contracts, they were able to pass the buck
around and around between themselves. London Underground refused to intervene
until forced to do so by the action of its workers.
Infrastructure sector workers report a deskilling of work processes alongside
slackening of work standards. For example, previously if a gang was sent
to sort out incorrect lateral alignment of the track and found incorrect
vertical alignment as well it would fix both alignments at the same time
– now they are only allowed to do the job on ticket, leaving a potentially
unsafe piece of track to be fixed at a later date.
This has all gone hand in glove with a series of attacks on tube workers’
jobs, pay and conditions. A multiplication of new employers, contractors
and sub-contractors has seen a cohesive group of workers on standard pay
and conditions facing major disparities in terms and conditions.
Job security is threatened with workers being potentially moved around
between different companies. Consortia managers have awarded themselves
large bonuses whilst pushing down workers’ pay and benefits.
The commercial imperative at the heart of PPP affects not just the infrastructure
workers now in the private sector but also the operational staff who have
remained with London Underground. As a result industrial relations have
become a minefield.
The RMT’s reputation as a union which is always calling strikes
is only the natural response of a union prepared to stand up to defend
its members.
Ken Livingstone started off in opposition to PPP. Back in Labour’s
fold he now works within it. The logic of his position has led him to
turn on tube workers, siding with the bosses attacking the RMT for defending
its members.
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