A crucial turning point as Bush plays “double or quits” in Iraq |
 |
Gilbert Achcar |
|
|
May was the worst month for US fatalities in Iraq since 2004 and the first anniversary of ’s failed onslaught on Lebanon approaches. Piers Mostyn asked GILBERT ACHCAR to provide an update on some recent developments, starting with a balance sheet of the US surge in Iraq. GA: It has been above all a surge in bloodshed and a major failure if we measure it by the Bush administration’s goal - nothing short of turning the whole Iraqi failure into a success story - But it very blatantly failed. The major goal was to create conditions through which they would change the political alignments in Iraq and set up a new alliance that would be close to the US and enable Washington to better manoeuvre in the country. Moqtada al-Sadr was a chief target of this whole operation and we can measure its failure by the way he is now back and very much prominent in the news, after having vanished for a while. He recently made a speech which had a more nationalist anti-sectarian edge, does this signal any change? I think he probably came to the conclusion that it is high time for him to renew or resume the political stance that he had been following until late 2005 or early 2006. The February 2006 Samarra attack [a devastating Sunni sectarian attack on the Shia mosque there] was a watershed in the Iraqi situation. That is when the image of al-Sadr turned from one of non-sectarian Arab-cum- Iraqi nationalist into one of leader of a Shiite sectarian militia. He is trying now to restore his previous image. He probably believes that the climate is right for a new attempt - after over a year during which the Shiites let off sectarian steam very intensively in response to the sectarian attacks they had suffered. Are you saying that the tit for tat sectarian escalation may have played its course and that Moqtada al-Sadr could return to a more nationalist discourse? Yes precisely. He probably feels that things can calm down now, at a time when it.s more urgent than ever for him to rebuild his image. He needs to reach out to the Sunni Arab Iraqis, because he understands that there is a major political operation going on of which he is a target. The two Kurdish leaders have recently made statements warning against an ongoing "plot" that aims at overthrowing the Maliki government. The other man who stands at the centre of this .plot. is none other than former US designated prime minister Iyad Allawi - the closest, most reliable stooge that the US and Britain have in Iraq. So the situation is getting very sensitive right now. We are at a crucial turning point in the Iraqi situation, facing a decisive moment in the coming weeks and months. And that’s when Moqtada al-Sadr has decided to go back on the offensive politically, which is definitely a clever thing to do for him. Are there any signs of a response from amongst the Sunni opposition groups? Well there are. Al-Sadr’s new tone is generally welcomed by the nationalists - in contrast to the sectarians - among Arab Sunnis. If you put aside the al-Qaida type of anti-US anti-Shiite fanatics, there are two types of forces among the Iraqi Arab Sunnis: on the one hand, those chiefly spurred on by sectarian and anti-Iranian views, which are close to the Saudis and willing to make deals with the US against the Shiites. And, on the other hand, those who consider the US as the main, most dangerous, enemy and who are therefore willing to make an alliance with anti-US Shiite forces - provided (as the fear of Iran is common to all Sunnis) these are forces that they deem to be independent enough from Iran. That is the case of Moqtada al-Sadr. Although he has obvious links with Tehran, which backed him increasingly over the last few years, he retains a certain degree of political autonomy and is known to be fiercely independent. Do you think we are heading for a crunch point, where the Americans will have to change course radically or even withdraw? It can’t be so simple. I have been describing what al-Sadr is trying to do. I didn’t imply that he is going to succeed. He can certainly find a certain measure of success, but a major success allowing him to be the winner in this whole confrontation is quite difficult to predict at this point. He’s facing quite difficult conditions. The Allawi operation is still going on. It is essentially an attempt at building a cross-sectarian political coalition using the lure of US support in order to topple the Maliki government and bring Allawi back to the helm as the "strong man" and saviour of Iraq. Although I wouldn’t bet one penny on the success of this operation, you can’t exclude it totally. You can’t exclude some kind of coup that would be backed by the US and the segment of Iraqi military forces that the US believes to be under their reliable control (if there are any actually). What is certain though is that we will see crucial changes in the coming period. For the Bush administration, the ongoing .surge. is a double or quits operation. They are under intensive pressure in the US. Although we have seen how the Democrats have shied away from pressing forward the issue of a timetable for troop withdrawal - the issue of Iraq is prominent in the presidential election and US public opinion has become much opposed to the continuation of the war. The Bush administration is playing what appears to be its last card. At the same time, the administration is covering its back by reaching out to Tehran - in a very limited way for a start - for a possible accommodation, as recommended by the Baker- Hamilton report. Turning to Lebanon, has the siege and bombardment of the Nahr el-Bared Palestinian refugee camp been a relative sideshow or does it have deeper connections? I think that whatever ignited the confrontation, one thing is obvious: it has been immediately exploited for a very definite agenda. This was (1) to test the ability of the Lebanese army to confront other forces, starting with the easiest - Palestinians, against whom Lebanese Shiite and Sunni soldiers alike can be united with no major risk of split along sectarian lines; and (2) to get the army to enter this Palestinian refugee camp in Northern Lebanon and take control of it under the pretext of fighting this group. This is why Hassan Nasrallah, the leader of Hezbollah, came out saying that he considered the penetration by the Lebanese army of the camp to be a "red line." Why did he say so, despite Hezbollah initially expressing its solidarity with the Lebanese army? Because he realised that this Palestinian camp has become a testing ground for the ability of the Lebanese army to implement a task that is part of UNSC Resolution 1559 (sponsored by Washington, London and Paris in 2004) calling for the disarming of both the Palestinian camps and Hezbollah. Nasrallah became aware that the battle of Nahr el-Bared is but a first step on a path that leads ultimately to the fight against his own forces. You can see that in the broad display of active solidarity with the Lebanese army in the ongoing confrontation: Washington is sending weapons and inciting all its allies to send whatever hardware the Lebanese army needs. This is an edited version of an interview conducted on 6 June 2007. |
|
